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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a company is having trouble meeting the earnings projections
of Wall Street analysts. If the company does not meet the projections by the
time it reports its earnings, its stock price will slump. Should it take the hit and
watch the fallout? Or should it somehow manipulate its earnings so they are
more in line with the analysts' projections? Then it could report inflated
revenues, thereby keeping the stock afloat and encouraging investors to
purchase its stock. If a troubled company's management chooses this path, the
company probably will not be able to go it alone. It would need the assistance
of other entities-lawyers, investment bankers, accountants, and possibly
+ Assistant Professor, John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Georgia. Many thanks to Professors
Jeffrey Van Detta and Lisa Taylor for reading early drafts of this Article and providing invaluable
suggestions. Thanks also to Amelia Ragan for her outstanding research assistance.
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contractual third parties-that would play an integral role in accomplishing
this fraud. Maybe these other entities would agree to falsify transaction
documents for the company. Maybe they would enter into transactions with
the company that look like sales of the company's money-losing assets so the
company could report earnings. Or perhaps they could simply "round-trip"
money between them and the company and use a trumped-up transaction as a
front. All of this would be done in an attempt to generate phantom revenue for
the company so it could meet its earnings projections, which it would then
report to investors in its financial statements. The company would most
assuredly be liable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and
Rule lOb-5 2 for misrepresenting its financial status to investors. But if another
entity helped the company to create revenue that did not truly exist, should that
entity also be liable for securities fraud to investors who bought the stock of
the company?
A preliminary question may be why should the entity that helped effectuate
the troubled company's fraud be liable to the investors who bought stock in the
company. Presumably, one goal is to punish as many wrongdoers who
participated in the scheme as possible. A more fundamental reason for
rounding up all culpable actors, however, is that the troubled company is likely3
bankrupt. As a result, investors of that company will see no recovery from a
Rule 1Ob-5 action against it. Therefore, an investor's only means of recovery
may be pursuing liability against the other entities for securities fraud. This is
especially important if, for example, an investor has lost all of his retirement
savings because his 401(k) portfolio was made up mostly, if not entirely, of
stock in the troubled company.4 Because that company may be in bankruptcy,
the stock is worth nothing and the investor has lost everything.
Whether a so-called "secondary actor" can actually be held liable under Rule
1Ob-5 has been debated in the courts,5 but the answer is still unclear. The
Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to determine this question when it
decided Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. on
6January 15, 2008. Unfortunately, its opinion was not as decisive as it couldhave, or arguably, should have been. The Court's opinion has been read to
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). Per the Supreme Court in SEC v. Zandford, the scope
and coverage of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is coextensive; thus, they are used interchangeably in this
Article. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002).
3. E.g., In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 198 (E.D. Pa. 2008); In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 637 (S.D. Tex. 2002); see also Motion for
Leave to File Brief Out of Time and Brief Amici Curiae of Former SEC Commissioners in
Support of Petitioner at 8, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
761 (2008) (No. 06-43).
4. See Peter T. Kilborn, In 401(k) Plans, a New Rush to Diversify, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2002, at C6.
5. See infra note 18; infra Part II.E and accompanying notes.
6. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008).
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reject liability for secondary actors,7 yet this Article suggests that it left open
the possibility for such liability, not to mention the possibility of additional
protracted litigation on the meaning of its language.
The Stoneridge decision was highly anticipated because of the effect it
would potentially have on private securities litigation; specifically, the
standards of acceptable conduct for corporate directors and officers, as well as
outside third parties. 8 The case followed in the wake of the Court's pivotal
1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,9 a
case that partially answered the scope of liability for secondary actors, yet
spawned confusion in the lower courts.'0 The Court in Central Bank held that
§ 10(b) does not prohibit "aiding and abetting" another's securities fraud."
As a result, secondary actors, such as lawyers, accountants, banks, and
contractual third-parties, cannot be held liable under § 10(b) for "secondary
violations" of the securities laws. 12 Liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
requires the use of a "manipulative or deceptive device," to perpetrate fraud on
the investing public.' 3 The Court reasoned in Central Bank that an entity's
mere aiding and abetting of another's fraud does not present the requisite
scienter necessary to be manipulative or deceptive. 14  Moreover, the Court
concluded, without explanation, that the plaintiffs had not established the
requisite reliance on the secondary actor's conduct to recover.15 It did note,
however, that any person or entity, in the capacity of a secondary actor, may be
primarily liable under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 "assuming all of the
requirements [of the claim] for primary liability ... are met,"16 but it did not
explore this statement in its opinion. Thus, two critical elements that a plaintiff
asserting a 1 Ob-5 claim against a secondary actor must establish are (1) that the
7. See Eric Berry, Stoneridge and the Short-Lived Experiment of Scheme Liability, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 355, 387-89 (2007); Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330, 330 (2008); Matthew L. Mustokoff, Fraud Not on the Market:
Rebutting the Presumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 4
HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 225, 242-43 (2008).
8. Thomas 0. Gorman, Who Does the Catch-All Antifraud Provision Catch? Central Bank,
Stoneridge, and Scheme Liability in the Supreme Court, in SEC. LITIG. & ENFORCEMENT INST.
2007, at 189, 198 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1620, 2007);
Gregory A. Markel & Gregory G. Ballard, The Importance of Stoneridge, in 39TH ANNUAL INST.
ON SEC. REG., at 879, 881 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1635,
2007).
9. 511 U.S. 164(1994).
10. See infra note 18; infra Part II.D and accompanying notes.
11. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S at 191.
12. Id
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
14. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176-77.
15. Id. at 180.
16. Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
secondary actor engaged in manipulative or deceptive conduct, and (2) that the
plaintiff relied on that manipulative or deceptive conduct. 
17
The holding from Central Bank has been difficult for the lower courts to
apply. 18 The difficulty arises from the varying interpretations of what § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 actually prohibit. 19 In other words, what is a "manipulative or
deceptive device," and thus, at what point does a secondary actor's
involvement in another company's scheme to defraud its investors rise to the
level of a primary violation of § 10(b)? Moreover, whether a plaintiff can
establish reliance on that conduct has been subject to debate. 20  These two
concepts have collectively come to be known as "scheme liability." 21 Lower
courts have struggled to determine whether scheme liability meets the
requirements for a Rule lOb-5 claim. Two recent circuit court decisions,
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.22 and Regents of the University of
California v. Credit Suisse First Boston,23 both discussed in greater detail in
24this Article, addressed this issue with differing results. These two cases,
notable for their contrary interpretations of scheme liability in the context of
Rule 1Ob-5's requirements, arguably set the stage for the Supreme Court's
Stoneridge decision.
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs could not
recover against certain secondary actors for securities fraud.25 While the Court
arguably determined that participation in a scheme to defraud is deceptive26
conduct, it held that the plaintiffs could not establish reliance on that
17. For a more complete discussion of the elements of a Rule I Ob-5 claim, see infra notes
33-42 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 386 (5th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub. nom., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008); Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043
(9th Cir. 2006); In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2006);
In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 705 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re
Lemout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161, 171 (D. Mass. 2003).
19. See Markel & Ballard, supra note 8, at 885-86.
20. See Regents, 482 F.3d at 382-84; Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1051.
21. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770
(2008); Regents, 482 F.3d at 378. This Article discusses the viability of scheme liability for
secondary actors that participate in another entity's scheme to defraud, as opposed to scheme
liability generally where there is simply one actor that has engaged in a scheme to defraud. See,
e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 815, 822 (2002) (holding that a securities broker's scheme
to defraud an elderly man and his mentally handicapped daughter by misappropriating their
securities without their knowledge and consent violated § 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5).
22. 452 F.3d 1040.
23. 482 F.3d 372.
24. Regents, 482 F.3d at 394; Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1055.
25. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 773-74.
26. Id. at 769.
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conduct. 27  In effect, the Court reasoned that the defendants' conduct-
falsification and backdating of commercial documents by customers of and
suppliers to Charter Communications, Inc.-was too remote to the injury
suffered by Charter's investors to establish reliance thereon. 28 The Stoneridge
decision signals, at the very least, another move by the Supreme Court away
from liability for secondary actors, 29 and, at most, a rejection of scheme
liability for secondary actors as a potential theory of liability. Yet a broad
reading of the opinion suggests there may be some flexibility for plaintiffs and
courts to maneuver within its confines.
The Court had the opportunity to illuminate for the lower courts whether a
secondary actor's participation in a company's scheme to defraud its investors
is prohibited conduct under § 10(b), yet the opinion neither accepted nor
rejected this contention and provided little guidance for answering the question
one way or the other. Moreover, its reliance analysis is less than definitive as
well. While arguably the Court eliminated the possibility that a plaintiff can
establish reliance on a scheme to defraud, given the relatively open-ended
nature of its language, the potential to craft a plausible reliance argument still
exists. A secondary actor's conduct must simply fall within the parameters the
Court set as a means of denying that reliance existed in Stoneridge itself. The
Court could have expressly rejected scheme liability, much as it expressly
rejected aiding and abetting liability in Central Bank. However, it did not, and
thus opportunities may exist for varying interpretations by lower courts of the
Court's language, thereby negating any exactitude with regard to this issue.
This assertion necessarily depends on a plaintiff's ability to distance the
conduct being complained of from aiding and abetting. Part II of this Article
examines the development in the courts of liability for secondary actors and
discusses in greater detail the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank. Part
I also addresses the Supreme Court's determination of how a plaintiff
establishes reliance on conduct prohibited by § 10(b). This determination took
on extreme importance in Stoneridge, because the Court used its reliance
analysis to seemingly shut down any opportunity for a plaintiff to assert that
participation in a scheme to defraud violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Yet this
Article posits that a secondary actor's conduct could potentially fit within the
confines the Court used to refute the existence of reliance in Stoneridge.
Part IL also addresses cases such as Simpson and Regents, wherein the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits, respectively, examined the viability of scheme liability, but
with conflicting results. The courts in those cases disagreed as to whether a
secondary actor's participation in a scheme to defraud is conduct prohibited by
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Moreover, they disagreed as to whether a plaintiff
27. Id. at 774.
28. Id. at 770.
29. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191-92 (1994).
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
could establish reliance on such conduct. Part III addresses in more depth the
Court's opinion in Stoneridge. The factual context of scheme liability has
become a fairly common theme in § 10(b) cases.3° It involves a design or plan
whereby secondary actors-who otherwise have no duty to the investors of a
particular company-assist the company in a scheme to defraud the investors
of that company. 31 Thus, the need to establish whether such conduct can form
the basis of a § 10(b) claim is of extreme importance. Part III also analyzes the
Court's decision in Stoneridge, particularly in light of the Simpson and Regents
decisions, and suggests that scheme liability may remain a feasible weapon in a
plaintiffs arsenal of claims against the secondary actors that helped perpetrate
the fraud. Given the possibility for varying interpretations of the Stoneridge
decision that could maintain scheme liability's viability, this Article concludes
with a discussion of what, if anything, is to be done to illuminate this issue
anew.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY FOR SECONDARY ACTORS
If a secondary actor is ever to be liable under § 10(b), it is necessary to
understand how the statute has been interpreted to apply to a primary
violator.32 The Supreme Court cases interpreting when § 10(b) liability is
appropriate have focused on two issues: the scope of prohibited conduct, and
what the elements of the claim should be.33 The reliance element of a § 10(b)
claim is one element that has created considerable confusion regarding
secondary actors and scheme liability.
34
A. The Scope of Conduct Prohibited by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
In pertinent part, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits any
person from "us[ing] or employ[ing], in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security, . . .any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."
35
30. E.g., Quaak v. Dexia, 445 F. Supp. 2d 130, 141-42, 144-46 (D. Mass. 2006); In re
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 503-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); SEC v. Lucent Tech. Inc.,
363 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715-18 (D.N.J. 2005).
31. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 382-83, 386-
90 (5th Cir. 2007); Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1047-50 (9th Cir. 2006).
32. See generally Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 171-72 (1994) (noting that the statutory text is important in defining the scope of the
conduct prohibited by § 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (stating that
in deciding what is "'fraud' under Rule 10b-5, 'we turn first to the language of § 10(b), for [t]he
starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself"' (alteration
in original) (second internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976))).
33. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 172.
34. See, e.g., Regents, 482 F.3d at 385-87, 390; Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1051-52; In re
Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2006).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). The pertinent text of the statute is as follows:
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The Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to the authority granted to
it under § 10(b), promulgated Rule 1 Ob-5, which states that it is unlawful
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
36
While the statute prohibits conduct that is "manipulative or deceptive," the
Rule attempts to delineate what that conduct might be. Subsection (b) of the
Rule prohibits the making of material misstatements of fact or any omissions
thereof. This prohibition has become the cornerstone of the securities fraud
action and is the subsection most relied upon by plaintiffs in such an action.
37
Thus, in a typical action brought under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5(b), "a plaintiff
must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.' 38 Importantly, however,
the Supreme Court has made clear that conduct-as opposed to a
misrepresentation or omission-may also violate § 10(b).39  This concept
implicates subsections (a) and (c) of the Rule. Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) are more
general and prohibit any "scheme" to defraud, in addition to any "act, practice,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered .... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in the contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
37. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972); see
also Markel & Ballard, supra note 8, at 883 (discussing what a typical plaintiff's § 10(b) claim
looks like); Berry, supra note 7, at 358 ("The majority of § 10(b) cases deal with deception in the
form of misstatements or omissions ... ").
38. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768 (2008)
(citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005)).
39. See id. at 769 (stating that conduct can also be deceptive and thus violate § 10(b)); Cent.
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (stating
that § 10(b) prohibits not only the making of a misstatement or omission, but also "the
commission of a manipulative act").
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or course of business which operates ... as a fraud.' 4° Various courts have
asserted that to state a claim under subsections (a) or (c), a "plaintiff must
assert that the defendant (1) committed a deceptive or manipulative act, (2)
with scienter, that (3) the act affected the market for securities or was
otherwise in connection with their purchase or sale, and (4) that the
defendant's actions caused the plaintiffs injuries.'41
In order to violate § 10(b), participation in a scheme to defraud must fall
within the proscriptions of the statute itself. In addressing the scope of conduct
prohibited by the statute, the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
held that the language of § 10(b) regarding a "manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance" does not proscribe negligent conduct, but rather imposes a
requirement that acts done in violation of § 10(b) must be done with scienter-
generally an "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.'42 Ernst was a case
involving a claim against a secondary actor-an accounting firm-for its
failure to discover major fraud in its audits of a securities firm. The president
of the securities firm, Nay, "induced the [plaintiffs] to invest funds in 'escrow'
accounts that he represented would yield a high rate of return." 44 But in fact
the escrow accounts did not exist, and Nay took the funds for himself.45 The
plaintiffs contended that if the accountants had conducted a proper audit, they
would have discovered certain irregular internal practices, 46  thereby
illuminating the fraud.47  Although Ernst was a case involving a secondary
actor, there was no necessity for the Court to answer whether secondary actors
could be held liable under § 10(b), because the plaintiffs could not establish the
requisite scienter necessary to state a claim.
48
Similarly, in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,49 the Supreme Court construed §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to mean that claims brought thereunder must involve
either a misrepresentation or omission on the one hand, or manipulative or
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(a), (c).
41. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 678 n.45
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 491-92 & n.90
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 197 (1976).
43. Id. at 188-90.
44. Id. at 189.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 190. The practice relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open mail either
addressed to him or his firm, or to his attention, even if he was not in the office. Id. The
plaintiffs alleged that if the accounting firm had conducted a non-negligent audit, it would have
discovered this "mail rule," and then disclosed in the firm's SEC reports that the rule prevented a
proper audit. Id. It was their contention that this disclosure would have led to an investigation
that would have uncovered the fraud. Id.
47. Id.
48. Seeid at 212,214.
49. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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deceptive conduct on the other.50 The Court defined "manipulative" to denote
manipulation of the securities market, and thus "refers generally to practices,
such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." 51  Absent an
allegation of manipulation, a plaintiff must allege deception, which the Court
said involves a misrepresentation or omission.52 In other words, to deceive an
investor, one must make a misrepresentation of a material fact, or fail to
disclose a material fact to the investor in violation of a duty to that investor to
disclose the same. Ernst and Santa Fe make clear that § 10(b) liability should
be based on prohibited conduct intended to deceive investors.
The question thus becomes, and the question the Supreme Court addressed,
albeit only implicitly in Stoneridge, whether a secondary actor's participation
in a scheme to defraud falls within these confines. Arguably, the Court has
accepted that assertion, because it simply stated in Stoneridge that conduct is
also deceptive. 53 It was fairly easy for the Court to acknowledge that fact,
however, because its analysis hinged on whether a plaintiff could ever
establish reliance on that deceptive conduct, thereby causing injury. But the
Court should have determined the boundaries of such conduct in the event a
plaintiff could ever establish that reliance exists.
B. The Reliance Element of the lOb-5 Claim
Not only is the scope of prohibited conduct relevant to the inquiry of
whether secondary actors can be primarily liable for a scheme to defraud, but
also whether a plaintiff can establish reliance on that conduct sufficient to state
a claim. Reliance by an investor establishes the causal link between a
defendant's deceptive act and a plaintiff's resulting injury.54 The Supreme
Court has acknowledged, however, that reliance in the classic sense may be
difficult for a plaintiff to establish and "would place an unnecessarily
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule lOb-5 plaintiff who has traded on an
impersonal [securities] market., 55 For example, it would be very difficult for a
plaintiff to establish whether he would have bought or sold securities of a
company if omitted material information regarding the company had been
disclosed, or if a misrepresentation about the company had not been made. As
such, the Court has adopted presumptions of reliance in certain instances,
thereby relaxing the proof requirement thereof.
56
50. Id. at 473-76.
51. Id. at476.
52. See id. at 473-76; see also Markel & Ballard, supra note 8, at 885 (asserting that
because the Santa Fe definition of manipulative was not often challenged, a plaintiffs claim
seemed to focus on showing a misstatement or omission).
53. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
54. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
55. Id. at 245.
56. Id. at 245, 247.
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As discussed above, most lOb-5 claims relate to lOb-5(b), which prohibits
making a misrepresentation or misstatement of a material fact or an omission
thereof.57 In the context of omissions of information, where one with a duty to
disclose information fails to do so, the Supreme Court held in Affiliated Ute
Citizens of Utah v. United States58 that the necessary nexus between a
defendant's wrongful conduct and a plaintiffs injury is presumed, assuming
the omitted information was "material., 59 Thus, plaintiffs whose claims are
based on nondisclosure of material information can satisfy the reliance element
of a lOb-5 claim by asserting this presumption. On the other hand, where there
have been false or misleading misrepresentations about a company in the
market, the Supreme Court, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, adopted a rebuttable
presumption of reliance based on a "fraud-on-the-market" theory of reliance.60
The fraud-on-the-market theory flows from the premise that a company's stock
price reflects all material information available in the market for that
company.61 Therefore, "'[m]isleading statements . . .defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements,"'
because the misleading statements affect the market price of the company's
stock. 62 The fraud-on-the-market theory posits that investors buy or sell stock
based on the integrity of the market and the price of the stock; if the misleading
information has in some way affected the market price of the stock, courts
presume that there has been reliance on the misinformation by the plaintiff.
63
Thus, although reliance is still a required element in the plaintiffs case, the
proof requirement has been significantly relaxed in these contexts.
64
In the context of secondary actors and scheme liability, the relevant inquiry
is whether the plaintiff can establish either of these two presumptions of
reliance in the absence of actual reliance on the scheme to defraud. It has been
unclear in the lower courts whether a secondary actor's participation in a
scheme to defraud should be construed as a misrepresentation or omission
under subsection (b) of the Rule, or as some other conduct under subsections
(a) or (c). 65 This inquiry is acutely relevant because its answer dictates which
57. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
58. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
59. See id. at 153-54 (defining information as "material" if "a reasonable investor might
have considered them important in the making of [an investment] decision"); see also TSC
Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining information as "material, if there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote").
60. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 229-30.
61. Id. at 241.
62. Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
63. Id at 246-47.
64. See id at 248. A defendant may rebut this presumption of reliance by introducing
evidence that the misrepresentation did not distort the stock price or that the "plaintiff traded or
would have traded [the stock] despite ... knowing the statement was false." Id.
65. See Markel & Ballard, supra note 8, at 885-86.
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presumption, if any, applies for a plaintiff to establish reliance in the context of
scheme liability.66  Moreover, once a court determines which presumption
applies, the Stoneridge decision makes clear that the plaintiff may not always
be entitled to rely on the presumption because of the factual context of the
case: specifically, whether the conduct engaged in by a secondary actor is
prohibited by § 10(b).67 But the factual context of a particular case is precisely
where the Court's opinion leaves room for an assertion of reliance on a scheme
to defraud. Assuming the facts can fit within the restrictions delineated by the
Court, a plaintiff might successfully mount a reliance argument.
C. Secondary Actor Liability Prior to the Supreme Court's Decision in Central
Bank
Notwithstanding the requirements for § 10(b) liability of establishing a
manipulative device and reliance thereon, lower courts continually held that
secondary actors could be liable for aiding and abetting another's fraud.6 8
These courts often presumed that a plaintiff could successfully state a claim
against secondary actors under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 without necessarily
establishing the elements of the claim as set forth above. 69 Notably, liability
was premised on Rule 1Ob-5(b):
plaintiffs rarely invoked subsections (a) and (c), because, as District
Judge Kaplan has surmised, during the pre-Central Bank era of
aiding and abetting liability, the "path of least resistance" for a
plaintiff alleging a fraud involving multiple actors was to plead that
one defendant misrepresented or omitted a material fact and that the
other defendants aided and abetted the making of that
misrepresentation or omission.7 °
The courts adopted variations of a rule to establish "secondary liability" under
§ 10(b), which required fraud in the sale of securities by the primary violator,
knowledge of that fraud or recklessness by a secondary actor, and substantial
66. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 678-79 (S.D.
Tex. 2006) (discussing that proving the applicability of a presumption of reliance relaxes the
requirement of demonstrating individual reliance on material misrepresentations or omissions and
makes class certification more available).
67. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008).
68. E.g., Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1978); Rolfv.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of
Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974).
69. E.g., First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 & n.13 (10th Cir.
1992), rev'd sub nom. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164 (1994); Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992);
accord K & S P'ship v. Cont'l Bank, 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943
F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991); Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1990).
70. Mustokoff, supra note 7, at 239 n.60 (citing In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d
472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
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assistance given to the primary violator by the secondary actor.71 Thus, these
lower courts effectively sidestepped the requirements that a secondary actor
engage in manipulation or deception. 72 Moreover, there was no need for a
plaintiff to assert reliance on the secondary actor's conduct, as that element
was not part of the secondary liability claim.
73
Thus, aiding and abetting another's primary violation of the securities laws
remained a viable theory on which to base liability. Yet courts and
commentators began to question whether aiding and abetting was an
appropriate theory on which to base liability, given these more restrictive
74decisions. As Professor Fischel posited in his 1981 article, cases such as
Ernst and Santa Fe made it apparent that the determination of liability for any
wrongdoer-whether a primary violator or a secondary actor-must be
established by looking at the "language, structure, and legislative history of the
relevant [securities] statutes. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court
decided Central Bank.
D. The Central Bank Decision
The Central Bank decision marked the end of aiding and abetting liability as
a theory on which secondary actors could be held liable for securities fraud.
The plaintiffs in Central Bank purchased bonds that the issuer ultimately
76defaulted on. The plaintiffs filed suit against the issuing building authority,
the underwriters of the bonds, the developer of the property the bonds were
issued to finance, and the indenture trustee, Central Bank. 7 The plaintiffs
alleged that the first three defendants violated § 10(b) by issuing the bonds and
that Central Bank "secondarily" violated § 10(b) for aiding and abetting the
other defendants' fraud.78  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
delineated what it considered to be the elements of a § 10(b) aiding and
abetting claim: "(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) recklessness by the
aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and (3)
substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor." 79
Applying that standard, the Tenth Circuit found that Central Bank could be
liable for aiding and abetting under § 10(b): it was aware of alleged
71. See supra notes 69-70.
72. See supra notes 69-70.
73. See, e.g., Pring, 969 F.2d at 898.
74. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 169; Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 650 F.2d 218, 220
n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability under Section 1O(b) of the Securities
Act of 1934,69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 82 (1981).
75. Fischel, supra note 74, at 82.
76. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 168.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898-903 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
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inadequacies regarding an appraisal for real property that was to serve as
collateral for the bonds; it knew that the issuance of the bonds was imminent;
and it further knew that the purchasers of the bonds would use the appraisal to
evaluate the collateral used to secure payment on the bonds in deciding
whether to purchase the bonds.80 Thus, the Tenth Circuit determined that the
plaintiffs had established a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
Central Bank acted recklessly under that court's test for § 10(b) aiding and
abetting liability, and could thus survive a motion for summary judgment.8 '
On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted that while § 10(b) does not
expressly create a private right of action,82 the Court has previously implied
that such a private right does exist.83  Nevertheless, the Court ultimately
concluded that the implied private right of action does not extend to aiding and
abetting 84 and thus, liabiliV was not appropriate for Central Bank under an
aiding and abetting theory.85 The Court reasoned that the scope of prohibited
conduct must be dictated by the statutory language; 86 thus, a plaintiff cannot
successfully bring a § 10(b) claim against a defendant for acts not prohibited
by the language of the statute itself. In its adherence to the text of § 10(b),
the Court first posited that § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting
because the plain language of the statute does not mention it.88 Further, the
Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the words "directly or indirectly" in
the text of the statute suggest congressional intent to prohibit indirect
violations of § 10(b), such as aiding and abetting a primary violation thereof.89
The Court reasoned that to extend the scope of the statute that far would reach
"persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a
degree of aid to those who do." 90 The Court concluded that if Congress had
intended § 10(b) to reach aiders and abettors, it would have used the words
"aid" and "abet" in the statute itself.91 Rather, as the statute clearly prohibits
manipulation and deception, the Court was unwilling to extend the statute's
80. Id. at 168-69 (citing Pring, 969 F.2d at 904).
81. Id. at 169 (citing Pring, 969 F.2d at 904).
82. Id. at 171.
83. Id. (citing Superintendent Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971)); cf J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-35 (1964) (implying a private right of
action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
84. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
85. Id.
86. Id at 173.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 175.
89. Id. at 175-76.
90. Id. at 176.
91. Id. at 177.
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reach to a party who simply aids another who commits a manipulative or
deceptive act.
92
In accordance with this interpretation, the Court determined that § 10(b)
prohibits the making of a material misrepresentation or omission, or the
commission of a manipulative act, but not the giving of aid to a person who
commits a manipulative or deceptive act.93 According to the Court, the mere
"giving of aid" would not involve the commission of a manipulative or
deceptive act. 94  However, the Court did not appear to limit the word
"manipulative" to include only conduct that technically manipulated the
securities markets, such as rigged prices and the like; rather, it appeared that
any activity that somehow affected the market price of a security would
qualify, so long as it was "manipulative." Yet the Court ultimately concluded
that Central Bank had not engaged in any manipulative or deceptive act, nor
had it made a misstatement or omission.95 This was a situation, according to
the Court, wherein Central Bank had merely aided and abetted another's fraud.
In closing, however, the Court did state that
[t]he absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under
10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under
Rule lOb-5 are met.
96
While this statement firmly rejected aiding and abetting liability,97 at the same
time it opened the door for a broadening of the scope of conduct relevant for a
§ 1 0(b) claim against a secondary actor.9
Central Bank's holding has proven difficult for the lower federal courts to
apply.99 The difficulty arises from the lack of parameters given by the Court
92. Id. at 177-78. The plaintiffs "concede[d] that Central Bank did not commit a
manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of § 10(b)"; rather, it should be held
"secondarily liable . . . for its conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud." Id. at 191 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 191.
94. Id. at 177-78.
95. Id. at 191.
96. Id. (emphasis in original).
97. Id.
98. See id. Although the Court stated that the language of the statute was dispositive, it
further reasoned that even if the statutory language did not resolve the case, there would
nonetheless be no private right of action. Id. at 178. One of the critical elements necessary for
recovery under § 10(b) was missing from the plaintiffs' case; the Court concluded, without
explanation, that the plaintiffs had not established the requisite reliance necessary to recover
under § 10(b). Id. at 180.
99. See supra note 18.
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on what conduct suffices for liability to attach, 100 particularly given that Rules
1 Ob-5(a) and (c) prohibit schemes or acts, practices, or courses of business that
operate as a fraud.10 In fact, at least one court has suggested that Central
Bank should be limited only to claims brought under subsection (b) of Rule
1 Ob-5.' 02 Although repudiating aiding and abetting liability, the Central Bank
decision provided scant guidance for determining when a secondary actor had
merely aided or abetted another's fraud, as opposed to having engaged in fraud
itself. As a result, after Central Bank, courts began expanding the meaning of
"manipulative device" to include more than market manipulation, or have
asserted that deception means something other than a misstatement or
omission. 0 3 And scheme liability premised on subsections (a) and (c) of Rule
lOb-5 emerged as a viable theory for liability. 104  Yet the theory had no
definitive test for determining primary liability for secondary actors, and
contrasting opinions among circuits surfaced.1
05
E. Cases After Central Bank
Following Central Bank, courts labored to define the parameters of scheme
liability under Rule lob-5. As one commentator has noted:
Courts that have rejected scheme liability arguments have
generally held that conduct is actionable under Section 10(b) or any
subpart of Rule lob-5 only if it (a) involved a material misstatement
or omission or (b) it involved manipulative securities trading
practices that artificially affect market activity and are therefore
"manipulative" within the meaning of the Santa Fe definition....
100. The circuits developed their own tests for determining primary liability after Central
Bank. The two that emerged were the "bright-line" and "substantial participation" tests. Gorman,
supra note 8, at 202. The bright-line test required the violator to actually make a
misrepresentation or omission. Id. at 203-04 (citing Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d
1215, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 1996)). However, the violator need not make the statement directly to
investors; rather, it was sufficient that they knew or should have known that the statement (or
omission) would reach investors. Id. at 204. The Eleventh Circuit also adopted the bright-line
test, requiring that the statement be attributed to the actor at the time of its dissemination. Id. at
207 (citing Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
The substantial participation test, on the other hand, allowed liability for anyone who
substantially participated in the preparation of a fraudulent document. Id. at 202 (citing In re
Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994)). These tests focus on liability
premised on Rule lOb-5(b), whereas scheme liability emerged later and was premised on Rule
1Ob-5(a) and (c). See Travis S. Souza, Note, Freedom to Defraud: Stoneridge, Primary Liability,
and the Need to Properly Define Section 10(b), 57 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1187-88 (2008).
101. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
102. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472,499 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
103. Markel & Ballard, supra note 8, at 885-86; e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.,
452 F.3d 1040, 1047-50 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.,
529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 704-06 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
104. See Souza, supra note 100, at 1180.
105. Seeidatl189-93.
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On the other hand, [other] courts ... have embraced the idea of
scheme liability. Some courts ... have held that active participation
in a fraudulent scheme, through actions other than material
misstatement or omission or manipulation, can be actionable because
"deceptive" [is] within the meaning of Section 10(b). Other courts
have held that active participation in a fraudulent scheme can be
actionable because it is "manipulative" within the meaning of
Section 10(b). Finally, there are courts that have not differentiated
between the two concepts and have merely held that such conduct is
actionable because it is "manipulative or deceptive." All of these
decisions, however, have difficulty distinguishing between aiding
and abetting, which is not actionable under Central Bank, and being
a primary violator in a fraudulent scheme.'
0 6
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits' decisions in the Simpson and Regents cases,
respectively, are two that have addressed the scheme liability theory with
differing results. Just as the courts' conclusions conflict regarding whether
participation in a scheme to defraud another company's investors is
appropriate conduct on which to base securities fraud liability, so do their
analyses regarding whether subsequent reliance on those schemes has been
established.
1. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.
In Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., Homestore.com, an online real estate
company, engaged in a series of triangular transactions that were sham "round-
trip" or "barter" transactions. 1° 7 Homestore would purchase shares, products,
or services from a third-party company, which in turn would buy advertising
from AOL Time Warner using all or most of the money Homestore paid the
third-party company.1° 8 AOL, after taking a commission, would pass the
money from this sale back to Homestore in accordance with an advertising
reseller agreement between Homestore and AOL.10 9 Additional transactions
involving L90, Inc. mirrored those involving AOL. l"0 The plaintiffs also
alleged that Homestore "grossly overpaid" Cendant Corporation for a real
estate website, i l l the purchase of which was contingent on a promise by
Cendant to "recycle" some of the money it received from the sale of the
website back to Homestore for transactions to be entered into over the next two
106. Markel & Ballard, supra note 8, at 885-86 (referring to the Eighth Circuit in Charter,
the Fifth Circuit in Regents, the Ninth Circuit in Simpson, the district court in Enron, and the
SEC).
107. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1043.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1044.
110. Id. at 1045.
111. Id. at 1044-45.
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years. 112In violation of an SEC accounting standard requiring companies to
report only the net revenue from these barter transactions, Homestore recorded
the money it received as gross revenue in order to meet its revenue
expectations, thereby deceiving its auditor, PriceWaterhouseCoopers." 1
3
The California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS), the lead
plaintiff in the class action litigation, brought a securities fraud claim against
AOL and two of its officers, Cendant and one of its officers, and L90.1 4
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the claims, ruling that CalSTRS failed to allege a valid claim for primary
liability under § 10(b). 115 The court held that, although the scope of § 10(b)
includes deceptive conduct in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, to be liable
as a primary violator under § 10(b), a defendant's conduct must have had the
"principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact in
furtherance of the scheme [to defraud]." ' 16 The court reasoned that being
involved in a deceptive transaction did not give rise to liability; rather, a party
must have contributed his own deceptive conduct to the "transaction or overall
scheme" to impose liability. 117 If the party's "[c]onduct [was] consistent with
the ... normal course of business," then that conduct could not normally have
a deceptive purpose.
The court determined that CalSTRS had not alleged that any of the
defendants acted with the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance in
furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 9 There was no indication that the
advertisements AOL sold and for which it received a commission "contained a
false appearance or other deceptive qualities," because they complied with the
legal advertising reseller agreement between Homestore and AOL.12 Further,
there were no allegations that showed how the funding set aside by Cendant for
the future transactions with Homestore in conjunction with Homestore's
acquisition of Cendant's website had any potential for misrepresentation or
false appearance when the future transactions were acknowledged and made
public in a press release by Cendant. Finally, there was no assertion that
L90 helped create the scheme or misrepresented its transactions with
Homestore. 1 Rather, L90 simply entered a legal transaction that Homestore
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1043.
114. Id. at 1042.
115. Id. at 1054-55.
116. Id. at 1048.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1049.
119. Id. at 1052-54.
120. Id. at 1053.
121. Id. at 1053-54.
122. Id. at 1054.
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manipulated as part of its scheme.1 23 According to the court, each of these
transactions merely gave Homestore the oportunity to record its revenue in
violation of SEC accounting standards. 12  The court refused to hold the
defendants liable for participating in legitimate transactions that were distorted
by Homestore's fraud.
25
Although the court held that a secondary actor's participation in a scheme to
defraud is prohibited conduct, it ultimately concluded there had been no true
scheme to "defraud" here, because the defendants lacked the requisite
culpability, or scienter. Nonetheless, the court set forth what it considered to
be the requisites for determining reliance, assuming a true scheme to defraud
had existed. The court determined that reliance is satisfied if "the introduction
of misleading statements into the securities market was the intended end result
of a scheme to misrepresent revenue."'1 26 Therefore, although the defendants in
Simpson themselves had not made any misrepresentations to Homestore's
investors directly, their participation in transactions to inflate Homestore's
revenues brought about the misrepresentations that the plaintiffs relied on.
127
Regardless of the fact that Homestore was the one that subsequently
misrepresented the revenues to its investors, the Defendants' conduct made
those misrepresentations possible.128 The roadmap used by that court operates
as follows: (1) "conduct by a defendant that ha[s] the principal purpose and
effect of creating a false appearance ...as part of a scheme to defraud" is
deceptive conduct for purposes of § 10(b) liability; and (2) "a plaintiff may be
presumed to have relied on th[e] scheme to defraud if a misrepresentation,
which... resulted from the scheme.., was disseminated into [the] market and
was reflected in the market price" for a security. 129 The court would thereby
allow a fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to be established on the
basis of a misrepresentation that was one step removed from the defendants'
participation in the scheme. However, having determined that the defendants
had not engaged in any prohibited conduct, the court had no occasion to
determine whether reliance existed.
130
123. Id. at 1045, 1054.
124. See id at 1053.
125. Id. at 1053-54.
126. Id. at 1051.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1051-52.
129. Id. at 1052 (stating that conduct is in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
as required by § 10(b), if "it is part of a scheme to misrepresent public financial information
where the scheme is not complete until the misleading information is disseminated into the
securities market").
130. See id. at 1053-54.
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2. Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Credit Suisse First Boston131 is in sharp contrast with the decision
in Simpson. The Regents court determined that a secondary actor's
participation in a scheme to defraud is not prohibited conduct under § 10(b),
nor could a plaintiff establish reliance on that conduct.' 32 Regents involved
more than thirty actions filed against Enron Corporation and later consolidated,
with the Regents of the University of California designated as the lead
plaintiff.133 The lawsuit arose because of the spectacular, and now all too
familiar, rise and fall of Enron. Before its 2001 collapse, Enron entered into a
series of partnerships and transactions that allowed it to remove liabilities from
its books and record revenue from certain transactions, thereby inflating its
financial condition. 134 The plaintiffs alleged that the banks Merrill Lynch &
Company, Inc., Credit Suisse First Boston, and Barclays, each entered into
these transactions, thereby allowing Enron to misstate its financial condition.'
35
An example of one such transaction occurred when Merrill Lynch agreed to
buy Enron's electricity-generating barges off the Nigerian coast. 136 Enron sold
to Merrill Lynch because it had not been able to sell to a legitimate purchaser
and needed to meet analyst estimates for the fiscal quarter.'3 7  An Enron-
controlled entity bought the barges back from Merrill Lynch within six
months.' 38 Although in effect a loan, Enron recorded the transaction as a sale,
and recorded the revenue from the transaction in its 1999 year-end financial
statements.1
39
The plaintiffs filed a § 10(b) claim against the banks for their part in
effectuating Enron's financial statement fraud. 140 The banks filed motions to
dismiss the claims, but those were denied by the district court.141 However, the
district court reconsidered some of the issues raised by the motions to dismiss
when it addressed whether to grant the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification. 42 The district court adopted the SEC's position that participation
in a 'transaction whose principal purpose and effect is to create a false
131. 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008).
132. Id. at 390, 392-94.
133. Id. at 377-78.
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appearance of revenues"' is a deceptive act as required by Rule lOb-5(c). 143
Because the court determined that the plaintiffs' claims involved an
overarching, concealed scheme to defraud, which involve[d] a large
number of alleged material misrepresentations or omissions, . . .
primarily aim[ed] at wrongful conduct by key participants that
allegedly employed a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or
engaged in an act, practice or course of business that operated as a
fraud, under Rule 1 Ob-5(a) and (c)[,]
the plaintiffs had successfully alleged a deceptive act. 144 The district court
further reasoned that a defendant who commits such a deceptive act can be
jointly and severally liable based on Rule lOb-5(a)'s prohibition against any
scheme to defraud. 45 Moreover, because the banks had engaged in deceptive
acts, the plaintiffs could also establish reliance on those acts; the district court
concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the class-wide
presumptions of reliance for both omissions and fraud-on-the-market. 146 With
143. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 705 (S.D.
Tex. 2006) (quoting SEC exhibit); id. at 707 (adopting SEC interpretation). The district court
noted that:
Determining when secondary actors are liable as primary violators of [§ 10(b)] is
especially difficult where the allegations are of scheme liability based on concealed
conduct under Rule I Ob-5(a) and (c). [The Banks] have argued that pleading scheme
liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), when a scheme participant that has engaged in a
sham transaction or fraudulent conduct that allows a securities issuer to submit false
and misleading financial statements but makes no statement itself, is no longer viable in
the wake of Central Bank, but is merely an attempt to circumvent its holding that aiding
and abetting is not actionable under the statute.
Id. at 701. The district court did not agree with the banks. See id. at 705-06.
144. Id. at 739.
145. Id. at 722-23.
146. Id. at 683, 739. The district court discussed that reliance may be presumed using the
Affiliated Ute presumption in cases based on material omissions. Id. at 679. On the other hand,
reliance may be presumed using Basic's fraud-on-the-market theory when the plaintiff alleges
there has been a material misrepresentation. Id. at 680. The court explained that "[tlo determine
whether an action is 'primarily a nondisclosure case or a positive misrepresentation case' for the
applicability of the [Affiliated] Ute presumption or the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Fifth
Circuit focuses on under which subsection of Rule lOb-5 the misconduct alleged by the plaintiff
falls." Id. at 681-82 (quoting Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 359-60 (5th Cir.
1987)). Thus, although Rule lOb-5(b) focuses on misrepresentations and omissions ("a failure to
state a fact necessary to make the statements made not misleading"), the Fifth Circuit has
determined that omissions also exist in the context of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
under Rule I Ob-5(a) or an "act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit" in the context of Rule IOb-5(c). Id. at 682 (citing Finkel, 817 F.2d at 360
("Cases involving primarily a failure to disclose implicate the first and third subsections of Rule
lOb-5; cases involving primarily a misstatement or a failure to state a fact necessary to make the
statements made not misleading implicate the second subsection. ... )). As such, the Fifth
Circuit has limited the Affiliated Ute presumption to cases with claims primarily based on alleged
omissions under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule I 0(b)-5, and the fraud-on-the-market presumption
to cases with claims primarily based on alleged "misstatements or failure to state a fact necessary
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respect to the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance regarding omissions, the
court concluded that the banks did have a duty to the plaintiffs; the "duty [was]
not a duty to disclose, but [rather,] a . . . duty not to engage in a fraudulent
scheme. ' ' 147  Moreover, the district court found that Basic's fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance was also available to the plaintiffs.
1 48
According to the court, where a scheme to deceive investors exists, a fraud on
the market exists as well and thus reliance is established because the scheme
disseminates false or misleading statements into the securities markets. 14' As a
result, the district court held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim against the
banks for a primary violation of § 10(b), even though they were secondary
actors.15
0
The banks appealed to the United States Court Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 51  The issue on appeal centered on whether the district court's
determination of a "deceptive act" could support "its application of the
classwide presumption of reliance."'' 52  In other words, for a class to be
certified, the court must find that "questions of law or fact common to
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting individual
members."' 53 As such, each plaintiff must be able to prove all of the elements
of a § 10(b) claim, including that fraud occurred and that the fraud proximately
caused the plaintiffs loss.' 54  Yet without the district court's "broad
conception of liability for 'deceptive act,"' which includes a scheme to
defraud, it could not have found that the entire class of plaintiffs could
establish a presumption of reliance.1
55
to make statements made therein not misleading" under subsection (b). Id. However, the Fifth
Circuit, according to the district court, has at times "intermingled the two presumptions of class-
wide reliance under [Affiliated] Ute and Basic" where allegations of schemes to defraud exist. Id.
at 684, 689. According to the court, schemes to defraud can implicate not only the withholding of
material information from the market, but also the dissemination of false or misleading
information. Id. at 686.
147. Id. at 683, 739 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 689, 739.
149. See id at 686.
150. Id. at744-45.
151. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir.
2007), cert. denied sub nom. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008).
152. Id. at 381-82. A related issue was whether the district court's acceptance of scheme
liability as a valid theory would "allow[] it to certify a single class of plaintiffs whose losses were
[commonly] caused ... by" many unconnected schemes, "rather than to certify subclasses whose
losses were caused by the actions of individual defendants." Id. at 382. The circuit court,
however, addressed only the definition of "deceptive act," because it was the dispositive issue on
appeal. Id.
153. Id. at 382.
154. Id. (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (stating that a private
securities fraud action can only be permitted where the plaintiff can prove "the traditional
elements of proximate causation and loss")).
155. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit noted that a collective interpretation of the relevant
Supreme Court securities fraud decisions would lead to the conclusion that §
10(b) prohibits acts involving manipulation or deception. 156  Further, the
Supreme Court has held that an act is not deceptive under § 10(b) unless the
actor had a duty to disclose to the investors. 57 Nor is an act manipulative
unless the act occurred directly in the market for the relevant security.'
58
Having determined that the banks did not owe the plaintiffs any duty of
disclosure, the banks' acts could not be considered deceptive under § 10(b).' 59
Moreover, because the banks did not act directly in the market for the Enron
securities, but rather engaged in a transaction with Enron, the banks' acts also
could not be considered manipulative.' 60 Using a narrow construction of the
scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b), the court concluded that the banks'
acts were neither deceptive nor manipulative, and thus did not violate the
statute.
61
To determine if reliance existed, the Regents court again looked to whether
the banks engaged in conduct prohibited by § 10(b) by examining the relevant
presumptions of reliance. 162 In other words, a presumption of reliance exists
only where there is either a misrepresentation of a material fact or an omission
thereof in violation of a duty to disclose. On the one hand, the court
determined that the district court's application of the Affiliated Ute
presumption of reliance with respect to omissions was incorrect.163 The banks'
acts of entering into fraudulent documentation were deemed to be
nondisclosure by the district court, and thus, an omission. However, the Fifth
Circuit determined that-an omission notwithstanding-the plaintiffs in
Regents nevertheless failed to establish reliance because the banks owed the
plaintiffs no specific duty of disclosure. 164 As a result, there had been no
deceptive act. Nor could the plaintiffs establish reliance on the basis of the
156. Id. at 387. The court discussed the Supreme Court decisions in Central Bank, Ernst, and
Santa Fe, as well as Chiarella v. United States, wherein the Court stated, "'[w]hen an allegation
of fraud is based upon non-disclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."' Id. at 387
(quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980)). The court interpreted Chiarella to
stand for the proposition that conduct relating to omissions, or a nondisclosure of information, is
only fraudulent when there is a duty to disclose the information. Thus, the court rejected the
district court's determination that engaging in a scheme replete with withholding of information
from the market violates a duty not to engage in the scheme, as opposed to a duty to disclose. Id.
at 384.
157. Id. at 387 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234).
158. Id. at 390 (citing Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (Higginbotham, J.)).
159. Id
160. Id. at 392.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 393-94.
163. Id. at 383.
164. Id. at 384-85.
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fraud-on-the-market theory without an overly broad reading of liability for
deceptive acts.' 65 To accept the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance
would have required a misrepresentation made by the banks, not an omission.
Because a deceptive act only includes omissions in violation of a duty to
disclose, allowing the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance was
inappropriate as well.
166
While the courts in both Simpson and Regents concurred that an act
prohibited by § 10(b) must be one that is "manipulative" or "deceptive," they
interpreted differently what that act might be. The court in Simpson held that a
scheme to defraud investors is conduct prohibited by § 10(b), however, it
required some level of culpability on the part of the secondary actor in order
for the conduct to be manipulative or deceptive.' 67 As such, the secondary
actor's conduct must be for the "principal purpose and effect of creating a false
appearance of fact in furtherance of the scheme."' 68 The court in Regents,
however, rejected a scheme to defraud as manipulative or deceptive conduct.' 69
It held that manipulative conduct under § 10(b) is only an act done directly in
the market for a particular security, whereas a secondary actor's conduct is
deceptive only if it owed to investors a duty to disclose. 170 Consequently, the
courts in Simpson and Regents each accepted a different premise on which
reliance either could or could not be based. The court in Simpson determined
that reliance could be established on a showing of a scheme to defraud
(including entering into documentation to create the fraud) and a subsequent
misrepresentation of material fact by the primary violator to the market that
resulted from the scheme. 171 Because an affirmative misrepresentation would
exist, albeit one step removed from the secondary actor's participation in the
scheme, the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance would be
appropriate. The court in Regents, on the other hand, determined that entering
into documentation is an omission of material fact, rather than an affirmative
misrepresentation. 172 Thus, without a duty to disclose the information, there
has been no deceptive act, and a presumption of reliance is inappropriate.
173
Given the conflict at the circuit court level, the time was ripe for the
Supreme Court to decisively resolve these issues among the courts. Against
this backdrop, the Supreme Court in Stoneridge affirmed the dismissal of
Stoneridge's claim; it concluded that Stoneridge did not state a claim for
liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because Stoneridge could not establish
165. Id. at 382.
166. Id. at 385-86.
167. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006).
168. Id. at 1049.
169. Regents, 482 F.3d at 384.
170. Id. at 386, 390.
171. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1051.
172. See Regents, 482 F.3d at 384-86.
173. Id. at 382, 390.
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reliance on the secondary actors' participation in a scheme to defraud. 174 Yet
while the Court rejected scheme liability for this particular case, the language it
used arguably allows for scheme liability in certain other factual settings.
III. THE STONERIDGE DECISION
A. Factual Background
The Stoneridge case involved a securities fraud claim against Charter
Communications, Inc., Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Motorola, Inc.
1 75
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were Charter's secondary actors. The
plaintiffs in this lawsuit were investors who had purchased Charter stock
during the relevant period. 176 Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, as the lead
plaintiff in the class action, claimed that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
assisted Charter in misrepresenting certain transactions between the entities in
order to inflate Charter's revenues in its publicly filed financial statements.
77
Stoneridge "filed a securities fraud class action on behalf of purchasers of
Charter stock" and sought to hold Charter, Scientific-Atlanta, and Motorola
liable under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.178 Charter ultimately entered into a
settlement with Stoneridge for $146,250,000 in connection with its violation of
§ 10(b) for filing fraudulent and misleading financial statements. 179  But
Stoneridge sought damages from the secondary actors as well for their part in
enabling Charter's financial statement fraud, 180 on the theory that without their
help in falsifying transaction documents, Charter could not have fraudulently
misrepresented its financial status to the public.!81  The Supreme Court
ultimately determined that Stoneridge could not recover. 82 Without explicitly
rejecting scheme liability as a viable theory of liability, the Court concluded
that Stoneridge could not state a claim under § 10(b) or Rule lob-5 against
either Scientific-Atlanta or Motorola, because it could not establish reliance on
either secondary actor's conduct.
1 83
Charter, a cable operator, was concerned with the effect that lower-than-
expected quarterly earnings would have on Wall Street's expectations




178. Id. at 767.
179. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1506, 4:02-CV-1186 CAS, 2005
WL 4045741, at * I (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2005). The district court noted that, "according to a study
by Bloomberg News, the settlement falls within the top 25 securities fraud class action settlements
of all time." Id.
180. See id. at *5.
181. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767.
182. Id. at 774.
183. Id.
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regarding Charter's performance. 8 4 By late 2000, Charter realized that the
fraudulent activity it had already engaged in would be insufficient to meet
projected earnings by a margin of $15 to $20 million.' 85 Charter's prior fraud
included "misclassification of its customer base; delayed reporting of
terminated customers; improper capitalization of costs that should have been
shown as expenses; and manipulation of the company's billing cutoff dates to
inflate reported revenues."' 86 To right this shortfall, Charter approached the
secondary actors with a plan to alter some of their respective transactions, with
the actors' full complicity. 187 The scheme worked as follows: both Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola supplied Charter with cable converter boxes to provide
its customers. 188 Charter agreed to overpay for each cable box by $20 until
year's end, and the secondary actors would use that overpayment to buy
advertising from Charter. 189 Though in reality a net wash, Charter recorded the
advertising purchases as revenue and capitalized its purchase of the cable
boxes, resulting in Charter's financial statements reflecting that it met its
projected revenue and operating cash flows.190 Although this scheme violated
generally accepted accounting principles, Charter's auditors 19 1 approved
Charter's financial statements because Charter and its secondary actors "de-
linked" the two transactions: at Charter's request, Scientific-Atlanta sent
documents to Charter that falsely stated that Scientific-Atlanta was increasing
its prices for cable boxes by $20 per box.192 Charter and Motorola, on the
other hand, agreed to language in Charter's purchase contract for cable boxes
that specified a certain quantity of cable boxes Charter was to purchase, yet
provided for liquidated damages of $20 per cable box in the event Charter
failed to purchase the specified amount. It was fully expected when the
contract was entered into that Charter would fail to purchase all the units and
pay the $20 per box to Motorola.' 94 Both of these contracts were backdated to
appear they had been entered into a month before the advertising purchase
agreements. 195 The accounting effect allowed Charter to record revenue and







191. Charter's independent auditor was Arthur Andersen LLP. Id Arthur Andersen was also
named as a defendant in this litigation; the Court, however, noted that it was unclear whether
Arthur Andersen was misled by Charter and the secondary actors or whether Arthur Andersen
was complicit in the fraud. Id. Ultimately, however, the Court concluded that Arthur Andersen's
involvement, or lack thereof, was neither controlling nor significant for purposes of the case. Id.
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operating cash flow from the advertising purchases of approximately $17
million, enough to close the gap on the shortfall it anticipated.
Stoneridge, the lead plaintiff on behalf of investors who alleged losses after
they bought Charter stock, filed a securities fraud class action lawsuit against
Charter, Scientific-Atlanta, Motorola, and others under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5.197 Stoneridge alleged that not only did Charter violate the securities laws,
but that its secondary actors did as well by participating in the scheme,
resulting in the fraudulent financial statements Stoneridge relied on in making
investment decisions.198  The district court granted Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. 199 The Eighth Circuit noted that, at most, the secondary actors aided
and abetted Charter's financial statement fraud, and according to the holding in
Central Bank, there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting under §
10(b)."' Rather, to recover for a § 10(b) violation against the secondary
actors, Stoneridge would have to show more than mere aiding and abetting of
Charter's primary violation of § 10(b); Stoneridge would have to show a
primary violation by the secondary actors.20' The circuit court's view was that
the allegations failed to show a primary violation of § 10(b) by Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola because Stoneridge made no showing of misstatements
made by the secondary actors to the investing public that induced reliance, nor
did it show that the secondary actors failed to disclose material information in
violation of a duty to disclose.20 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the circuits for when an investor may recover from
a secondary actor under § 10(b).20 3
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis of a Scheme to Defraud and a Plaintif's
Reliance
The Court first noted that § 10(b) liability does not extend to aiding and
204abetting liability. Rather, in order to show liability, a plaintiff must establish205
a primary violation of § 10(b) against a secondary actor. Against this
backdrop, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Stoneridge's case
against the Charter secondary actors, concluding that Stoneridge had not
alleged any deceptive act prohibited by § 10(b), and "that only misstatements,
omissions by one who has a duty to disclose, and manipulative trading
196. Id.
197. Id. at 766-67.
198. Id. at 767.
199. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2006).
200. Id. at 992.
201. Id. at 992-93.
202. Id. at 992.
203. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767-68.
204. Id. at 769.
205. Id.
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practices ... are deceptive within the meaning of the rule."206 The Supreme
Court noted that if the Court of Appeals meant that only statements, oral or
written, can form the basis for § 10(b) liability, that interpretation would result
in an erroneous application of the law.20 7  Rather, conduct can also be
deceptive and provide such a basis.208 As such, the Court interpreted the Court
of Appeals' holding to suggest that, although Charter's secondary actors may
have engaged in deceptive acts prohibited under § 10(b) by virtue of their
assistance in altering certain documents, Stoneridge did not rely on those
209
acts. And because reliance is one of the required elements of a § 10(b)
claim, Stoneridge failed to state a claim.
210
Further, in light of the presumptions of reliance discussed above, the Court
determined that neither presumption applied to the facts of the case. First,
neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola had a duty to disclose the fraudulent
transactions to Stoneridge.212 Thus, their failure to disclose the falsified
documentation could not form the basis of any presumption of reliance on the
part of Stoneridge, because there had been no omission in breach of a duty
owed to them.213  Second, the secondary actors' conduct was not
communicated to the public. The Court reasoned that "[n]o member of the
investing public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents'
deceptive acts during the relevant times." 214 As a result, reliance could not be
established using the fraud-on-the-market theory. In other words, Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola's acts were not communicated to the public; rather,
Charter made misrepresentations regarding its financial status in its own
publicly filed financial statements. The secondary actors did not make any
such statements, even though by falsifying documents they had formed the
basis for Charter to make its misrepresentations. Thus, the Court concluded
that Stoneridge could not establish the requisite element of reliance.
215
Stoneridge asserted reliance as follows: Had Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
not helped Charter falsify its financial statements, Charter's auditor would not
have been deceived, and Charter's publicly filed financial statements would
have reflected its true financial condition more accurately.216 And by virtue of
their scheme with Charter, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola made an indirect
misrepresentation to the public that Stoneridge relied on when making its
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investment decision to purchase Charter's stock.217  The Court rejected this
argument, asserting that adopting this concept of reliance would cast the net of
potential liability to the marketplace at large, and the Court was unwilling to so
broaden the scope of § 10(b). 2 8 The Court's argument rested on the principle
of reliance being closely linked to causation: a defendant's deceptive acts and
a plaintiff's reliance thereon must be linked "immediate[ly]" 219 rather than
remotely, insofar as the deceptive acts must be "'in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security."' 220 Although the reliance requirement and the
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" requirement are
distinct from each other, the Court found them related enough to conclude that
Stoneridge's reliance on the secondary actors' deception was too far removed
from its purchase of Charter's securities. 22  The Court reasoned that although
§ 10(b) is "'not limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets,' it
does not reach all commercial transactions that dre fraudulent and affect the
price of a security in some attenuated way." 222 The Court also raised the
concern that extending the scope of liability to include generic "contracting
parties" might necessarily increase the cost of doing business out of fear of §
10(b) liability.22 3 Similarly, overseas firms may shy away from doing business
in this country which could "raise the cost of being a publicly traded company
... and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets., 224 The
Court concluded its opinion by signaling the SEC's role in enforcement of §
10(b) claims against secondary actors. 2
25
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Stoneridge Decision: Does Scheme
Liability for Secondary Actors Remain a Viable Theory for Recovery?
Various commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court rejected
scheme liability in Stoneridge.226 However, the Court never expressly rejected
scheme liability in the opinion, unlike its explicit rejection of aiding and
abetting in Central Bank. Moreover, the Court's rather indistinct language
in the opinion suggests that plaintiffs may be able to assert scheme liability for
217. Id.
218. Id. at 770-71.
219. Id. at 770.
220. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 771 (citation omitted) (quoting Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
223. Id. at 772.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 773-74. The Court noted that allowing Stoneridge's theory of liability to extend
to these secondary actors would undermine Congress's determination that the SEC is solely
responsible for pursuing aiders and abettors. Id. at 773.
226. See supra note 7.
227. See supra Part II.D.
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some secondary actors that participate in a scheme to defraud. The first
example of its somewhat open-ended language is the Court's assertion that
"conduct," in addition to misrepresentations and omissions, can also be a
"deceptive act" prohibited under § 10(b)."' The Court thus appears to have
casually accepted that participation in a scheme to defraud is, at least,
deceptive, and can therefore be violative of § 10(b), which offered some
credence to the separation of subsections (a) and (c) from subsection (b) of
Rule lob-5. Yet the Court gave very little guidance as to what types of acts are
relevant in this context. It merely concluded that in this case, entering into
backdated contracts is a "course of conduct [that] include[s] both oral and
written statements.,, 229 Thus, a "course of conduct" might include other types
of conduct not engaged in by Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola. Moreover, the
Court described the secondary actors' conduct as "ordinary business
operations" and an "arrangement... in the marketplace for goods," as opposed
to conduct in the "investment sphere. 23 ° In other words, Motorola's and
Scientific-Atlanta's conduct was simply that of a customer or supplier entering
into a business transaction. In the context of their deceptive acts, neither was
engaged in any conduct directly involving the securities markets. This posture
provides a potential basis for secondary actor scheme liability: to the extent a
secondary actor has engaged in fraudulent conduct that is within the
investment sphere, the court could determine the secondary actor has engaged
in manipulative or deceptive conduct that violates § 1 0(b).
Yet there is no discussion in the opinion, like there was in the Simpson
decision, regarding the extent to which such conduct would rise to the level of
. - 231
being manipulative or deceptive. Rather, the Court clung to the concept that
any assistance given by a secondary actor to a primary violator is merely
aiding and abetting, regardless of the deceptive nature of such conduct.
232
Importantly, however, the Court's rejection of aiding and abetting liability in
Central Bank was not based simply on an actor's participation in a scheme, but
233
rather on the culpability, or scienter, attributable to the actor. Thus, the
Court's implicit recognition of conduct as potentially deceptive in Stoneridge
creates an opportunity for a secondary actor's conduct to be deemed
manipulative or deceptive, despite the role such conduct may have played in
effectuating another company's securities fraud. Notwithstanding the Court's
connection in Stoneridge between participation in a scheme and aiding and
abetting, this association is seemingly linked in the opinion to the notion of
secondary actors as commercial actors, as opposed to actors in the securities
228. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
229. Id. at 769.
230. Id. at 770, 774.
231. See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006).
232. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771.
233. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994).
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markets. 234 Thus, if a court could find that a secondary actor has engaged in
manipulative or deceptive conduct in the investment sphere, the Court has left
a potential opening between where aiding and abetting ends and primary
liability for a secondary actor begins.
Yet this opportunity may be much ado about nothing, because arguably a
plaintiff could never establish reliance on a scheme to defraud using either
presumption of reliance. The Court reasoned that to establish reliance on the
basis of conduct, the existing presumptions are the only means to establish
reliance, absent actual reliance. 23 According to the Court, the secondary actor
must therefore have a duty to investors to disclose information to apply the
Affiliated Ute presumption.236  Alternatively, the fraud-on-the-market
presumption would require that the secondary actor's deceptive conduct be
communicated to the public. 237 The Court also imposed a more immediate
connection between the secondary actor's conduct and the plaintiffs injury to
survive a remoteness claim. In other words, the deceptive conduct must not be
too remote from the injury in order to be "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of a security.
238
Although conduct must be communicated to the public in order to establish
fraud-on-the-market reliance, the Court never made clear who must
communicate the deceptive acts, because the Court's language was vague with
each reference to this requirement. 239 Although the Court did state that the
"implied right of action does not reach [the secondary actors] because the
investors did not rely upon their statements or representations, 2 40 that
statement is rendered ambiguous by the Court's reference to conduct as a
statement. 241 In other words, if conduct can include statements, as well as
other behavior, so long as the conduct in whatever form is publicly
communicated, the fraud-on-the-market presumption should be appropriate.
At least one court has interpreted Stoneridge's holding as requiring the
secondary actor to communicate its conduct to the investing public.242 If this is
234. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772.
235. See id. at 769.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 770.
239. See id. at 766, 769.
240. Id. at 766 (emphasis added). The Court later stated that the secondary actors' "acts or
statements were not relied upon by the investors." Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 769.
242. See Burnett v. Rowzee, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2008). In Burnett,
defendant Halstead was the "pitch man" for a financing transaction. Id. at 1123. The plaintiff
agreed to invest funds in short-term loans to companies in the process of obtaining the financing.
Id. No financing was ever arranged; rather, the principals of the scheme simply solicited
additional investments from subsequent investors and used those investments to pay returns to
earlier investors-in essence, a Ponzi scheme. Id. The court held that the plaintiff had
established reliance on this scheme because the plaintiff had direct contact with the principals of
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so, there might be more opportunity for courts to require less in the way of
immediacy between the conduct and the injury. Because the secondary actor
would have effectuated a fraud on the market by disclosing its conduct itself to
the market, that actor would now presumably be in the "investment sphere" for
having made the statement. Unfortunately, however, if a plaintiff is able to
establish fraud by the secondary actor on the basis of a public statement, then
the plaintiff has not availed itself of scheme liability for secondary actors at all;
rather it has merely established fraud on the basis of a statement under Rule
1Ob-5(b), and has arguably established reliance on the basis of actual reliance.
The question then becomes whether the possibility exists to establish fraud-
on-the-market reliance on the basis of a communication made by the primary
violator to its shareholders regarding the secondary actor's conduct. Assuming
Charter had included in its publicly filed financial statements a description of
the transactions entered into with Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta, instead of
including merely the effect these transactions had on Charter's revenues,
would that have changed the landscape? Arguably not in Stoneridge, because
the Court deemed their conduct too remote from the plaintiff's injury. Because
their actions were ordinary course of business transactions, as opposed to
securities transactions, there was insufficient immediacy between their actions
and Stoneridge's injury. But how "direct" must this connection be? This is
where the secondary actor's conduct could become relevant in determining
how remote its conduct is to the plaintiffs injury. The Court did provide that
actions in the "realm of ordinary business operations" are generally too remote
to be considered "in connection with" a securities transaction.243  Again,
arguably, there is an opportunity for varying interpretations as to what actions
take place in the "investment sphere," versus the "marketplace for goods."
Similarly, the prospect exists for plaintiffs to take advantage of the Court's
analysis of the remoteness of a secondary actor's conduct. For example, had
Charter and Motorola engaged in a fraudulent securities transaction, as
opposed to an ordinary course of business transaction, and had Charter
reported the transaction in its financial statements, would a plaintiff have
established an immediate connection sufficient to assert fraud-on-the-market
reliance? Presumably, the fraudulent securities transaction between the
secondary actor and the primary violator need not be the transaction that a
plaintiff participates in to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement.
244
the scheme and directly relied on the interest to be paid in making their investment. Id. at 1128.
But see Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that where the
defendant was the "mastermind" of a scheme to defraud, yet did not prepare press releases, the
causal chain was too indirect to establish reliance on the scheme).
243. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
244. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655-56 (1997). The Supreme Court in
o 'Hagan determined in the context of the misappropriation theory of insider trading that the "in
connection with" requirement is satisfied "even though the person or entity defrauded is not the
other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information." Id at 656. The
Court went on to note that "[t]he misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)'s language,
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Thus, that requirement may have a better chance of being established if there is
some communication of the deceptive act. Moreover, the Court suggested that
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola's acts were too remote from Stoneridge's
injury to satisfy reliance because "nothing [they] did made it necessary or
inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did., 245 Arguably, a court
could thus allow reliance to exist if the secondary actor somehow made it
"necessary or inevitable" for the transaction to become public information.
Again, this language, while limiting Stoneridge's ability to assert scheme
liability, could be relevant in another context, given its ambiguity. Presumably
the Stoneridge Court used it to suggest that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
could have backdated or falsified numerous transaction documents at Charter's
request, but ultimately Charter could have decided to report its income
correctly. However, the words "necessary or inevitable" could give rise to
another interpretation by a court in a different context.
Thus, the vagueness of some of the Court's language creates the possibility
that an entrepreneurial plaintiff and a willing court may interpret the holding
from Stoneridge to find a secondary actor liable on the basis of scheme
liability. The true stumbling block for a plaintiff would be whether he could
establish fraud-on-the-market reliance in the absence of actual reliance on the
scheme.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Stoneridge may have thought it closed the door on
scheme liability for secondary actors as a viable theory of liability in the
absence of actual reliance. However, what the Court may have intended and
what the Court actually wrote are two different things. Within the confines of
its opinion, a broad reading suggests there may still be room for plaintiffs to
construct a plausible argument, particularly in light of the fact that the Court
did not expressly reject the theory. It is doubtful that the Court will revisit the
issue of § 10(b) liability for secondary actors anytime soon because it denied
246certiorari in the Regents case a week after deciding Stoneridge. The Court's
refusal of an opportunity to further hone this difficult-but important-issue of
the precise scope of secondary actor liability may well have injurious effects.
On one hand, lower courts may read the opinion as rejecting scheme liability
entirely, thereby eradicating any possible recovery for wronged plaintiffs in
this context. On the other hand, the absence of any definitive rejection of
scheme liability may allow courts to impose liability on secondary actors. Or
at the very least, such absence may allow a court not to dismiss the case in the
early stages of a proceeding.
which requires deception 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,' not deception
of an identifiable purchaser or seller." Id. at 658.
245. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
246. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120
(2008) (mem.).
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Yet the Court's refusal to extend Rule I Ob-5's implied private right of action
to allow scheme liability in all cases is due in large part, if not entirely, to a
lack of congressional intent to extend it.247 Thus, Congress could act to clarify
whether scheme liability for secondary actors is in the purview of § 10(b), but
its doing so would likely depend on a variety of factors, including the goals of
the new presidential administration. 248 But as the Supreme Court's decision in
Stoneridge is certainly one extolling the public policy concern of increased
litigation beyond the realm of the securities laws, Congress may wish to
advance a competing policy concern of deterring culpable conduct.
SEC rulemaking is another means by which the securities laws may be
changed. Certainly, the SEC could not disregard clear Supreme Court
precedent interpreting a Rule lOb-5. 24 9 Thus, the SEC could not, for example,
adopt a rule that states a new method by which a plaintiff could establish
reliance on a scheme to defraud. Yet because the Court did not expressly
reject scheme liability as a viable theory on which to base liability, the SEC
could adopt rules that supplement Rule lOb-5 to elucidate the contours of
scheme liability for secondary actors. 250 Specifically, it could clarify what it
means for conduct to be "immediate" as opposed to remote. Similarly, it could
identify when conduct is in the investment sphere or not, or when it is
sufficiently in connection with a purchase or sale of a security for the causal
connection between the deceptive conduct and the injury to bolster reliance.
Having rules in place to determine the boundaries of scheme liability would
arguably be beneficial, both to the regulated as well as to the investor, even if
247. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771-73; see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 961, 998 (1994) (citing Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S 286, 299-300
(1993) (Thomas, J., joined by Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting)) (stating that certain
members of the Supreme Court have expressed concern over the Court's continued acceptance of
Rule 1Ob-5's implied private fight and that it should not be extended absent any congressional
support).
248. See Black, supra note 7, at 339-40. Professor Black suggests that Congress could be
persuaded to amend the securities laws because of the purported lack of effectiveness of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737-65 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which was enacted after Central Bank "to curb the abuses of
securities fraud class actions," as well as the reduced liability after Central Bank, which "may
have led to participation by accounting firms and investment banks" in the Enron and WorldCom
financial scandals. Black, supra note 7, at 339.
249. See Grundfest, supra note 247, at 984 (stating that while the SEC has the authority to
define the conduct that violates § 10(b), the doctrine of stare decisis would preclude it from
disregarding the Supreme Court's prior interpretation of a statute).
250. See id. at 1011-12. The main premise of Professor Grundfest's article is that,
notwithstanding judicial acceptance of a plaintiff's private right of action for securities fraud, the
SEC's rulemaking authority would allow it to "disimply" such a right. Id. at 976-78. Absent
complete disimplication, however, the SEC also has the authority to tighten the elements a
plaintiff must establish in a lOb-5 claim. Id. at 1011.
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that benefit was simply certainty of the law. 251 If any such adopted SEC rule
withstood judicial scrutiny, scheme liability for secondary actors could
potentially be more readily established.
However, the likely result of Stoneridge will be that the lower courts must
make determinations as to when-if ever-a plaintiff has established fraud-on-
the-market reliance based on a secondary actor's deceptive act in the context of
a scheme to defraud. And thus, expensive and protracted litigation will
continue; not necessarily over whether a secondary actor has wronged
investors in cases of corporate crisis, but rather over whether the laws in place
even cover the conduct asserted by plaintiffs.
251. See James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J.
625, 663 (2007).
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